As the Honduran crisis continues unresolved, an even more worrying situation is developing next-door in Guatemala. Alvaro Colom, the country's president, declared a "state of calamity," yesterday in response to his country's quickly developing food crisis. According to the BBC, roughly 54,000 families are suffering from food shortages at current, and an additional 350,000 Guatemalans are at grave risk of food insecurity in the coming months.
According to Colom, the country's most recent bout with crisis resulted from a combination of extreme drought, nutrient-depleted soil, and the residual effects of the global economic downturn. In total, the country's harvest suffered a near 50 percent reduction in yield in basic staples.
Colom's decision to proactively address the growing threat of mass starvation is not only an act of responsible government, but makes for smart politics to boot. With the unattended wounds from the coup crew's bludgeoning of democracy still festering in Honduras, and the failure of its neighbors-most conspicuously the United States-to label the overthrow of Manuel Zelaya a military coup, some have expressed concern that social unrest or a humanitarian disaster could embolden militaries in Central America to topple their governing regimes as well.
As I've discussed previously, the leftist regime of Colom is particularly vulnerable. Colom has been under siege publicly for some time now, accused of ordering politically motivated hits on opponents as the Guatemalan state cedes territorial sovereignty to Mexican drug runners, and the country's people suffer from exploding crimes rates.
Colom's decision to assert control and responsibility preemptively will hopefully head-off the worsening of an already grim situation, where over 1,000 children are hospitalized each year from malnutrition, and where funds for World Food Program activities in the country are beginning to dry up. In addition, Colom's decision to seek global governmental assistance has the advantage of establishing a robust international presence in Guatemala which may go far in preventing any threats to his presidency.
But here's a thought experiment: what were to happen if the Micheletti regime in Honduras offered substantial assistance to their starving neighbors in Guatemala? Should Colom accept it, especially if aid from other neighbors is meager and slow to develop? Or do Guatemalan authorities reject it on principle, even if this means risking the best interests of its population?
6 Comments
Hi Michael, with everything going on in Honduras these days, it's good that important issues like this are not being shut out of media attention. You raise an interesting questions about what to do if Micheletti offers aid. I think in situations like this, you take whatever help is offered; even if you have to hold your nose to do it. I think a comparable situation would be when, following Huricane Katrina, Cuba offered to send over 1100 doctors and thousands of tons of medical supplies to victims in New Orleans....unfortunatley this offer was turned down for political reasons. What do you think Michael?
Hi Mike, Thanks for the comment. I was thinking about the Cuba case as well, actually. The main difference it seems to me is that, while the American government responded with what I would consider criminal neglect, the state itself had the capacity for a robust response. In this instance, it could deny Cuban offers on political grounds and still handle its business in New Orleans. Unfortunately, it chose to do the former without attending to the latter. The problem was not one of means, but execution.
As for Honduras, I'm not sure I agree entirely. I think if I were Colom, and Honduran aid was the only readily forthcoming, I would use it as a naming and shaming device to elicit greater support from other allies. After all, it would be internationally embarassing if neighboring democracies were seen as not caring less, while the region's only illegitimate government was rushing to the rescure. At first, at least. Obviously, if everyone else were willfully neglecting an emerging crisis, then yes, I suppose you take what you can get, and hold your nose while doing it.
But then the question becomes: what are the consequences regionally and internationally? Does acceptance of aid earn the Honduran regime some much-needed legitimacy? Does Honduras capture good will in the global arena? Would this spark further tensions between it and the likes of Chavez, Ortega, and Obama?
Hi Michael, I also thought about using fictitious Honduran aid as a bargaining chip with other allies, but I think it depends on the political atmosphere at the time. If you have exhausted all other alternatives then I think we both agree...you take what you can get.
As for the political fallout, I think there is no question that the acceptance of aid would give the Honduran regime added legitimacy even though the regime would be the exact same the day after delivering aid as it was the day before. It shouldn't change things, but it would. I guess it comes down to another one of those means/ends debates. Here is another thought experiment for you. What if Honduras winds up with a better, more responsive government as a result of this coup? Which outcome is better - a bad but legitimate government or a good but illegitimate government. And I want to emphasise that I am not saying Micheletti is better than Zelaya...but what if?
Hey Mike. Great question. It seems to me a variant on the gamble taken by the Bush administration in its decision to overthrow Saddam Huessein: it might be ugly at the start, but if the final outcome is positive for the people, then it will be justified by history.
Still, I think the Honduran case is different. In the first place, Honduras had a democratic system that was not given the opportunity to respond to Zelaya's challenges to it, but was short-circuited by the military's ejection of the president, and Micheletti's ascension to the throne. So, we don't have an answer to one half of your question; in other words, we don't know what a bad but legitimate government would have looked like, nor do we know if it would have even come about. Second, even if Micheletti and company prove to be responsive in their governance (it's not 100 percent clear to me what this means, exactly, but I'll go with it nevertheless!), a troubling precedent has been set, no? Namely, that if a government is not doing a good job, or seems to be engaging in a power grab, that instead of letting the system work, an acceptable alternative is to simply overthrow the government. The instability that this inculcates in the system strikes me as far from the public good. So, even if Micheletti is effective in the short run, the long-term consequences are what I think are most important. No government succeeds ad infinitum,
What do you think? And to complicate things further still, let's say Micheletti succeeeds and provides decent governance for his people, but his intial power-seizing actions encourage and set off a chain of other coups in Central America, would it have been worth it from a bird's eye, theoretical point of view?
Hi Michael, to answer your question; it would undoubtedly set a negative precedent if coups were seen as an acceptable form of....let's call it "governmental reform" ;) But in this particular case, do you believe that working with Micheletti would set such a precedent? On a conceptual level no doubt it would, but do you believe there are other would be malcontents sitting in the weeds watching to see how this all unfolds before launching their own coup? Or do you think this will be viewed as a "blip" on the radar and if a year or so down the road there is another election in Honduras (either legitimizing Micheletti or replacing him)....does all of this goes away? And what are the implications of this? AND...given our past tolerance for military coups does anything really change?
Getting back to the food crisis and the question of accepting aid, let me frame this issue this way...who is President Colom most responsible to; his people or the broader international community. I would think that his responsibility to the people of Guatemala would trump his international diplomatic obligations.
Hey Michael,
Good post - nice to know read on issues pertaining to that region of the world.
Just a quick question: in your headline you used the term "food security". Do you take a constructivist view of security? Do you accept the connotations of "food security"? Should food really be securitised - and if so, to what end?
Cheers!
M