And so here we have it.  The likely denouement for both Roberto Micheletti and Manuel Zelaya's political careers began to take shape on Monday as Honduras' ousted president surprised the world with a secret return to Tegucigalpa.  What ensued revealed both the ejected leader's taste for macho adventure and high drama, and the de facto regime's incompetence, poor judgment and impatience. 

On Monday afternoon, reports began to surface that Zelaya had successfully engineered a successful return to the country with the assistance of Brazil and possibly the United States, and had holed up with roughly seventy of his closest friends in the Brazilian embassy in the capital.  This appeared to be news to the Micheletti crew, who continued to assert their firm belief that Zelaya was in Nicaragua. (In fact, Zelaya crossed the border from Guatemala.)  Any delusions harbored by Micheletti were banished the moment Zelaya stepped foot outside the embassy to announce his return. 

The de facto regime's response to Zelaya's arrival bore all the hallmarks of a deliberate government respecting democratic and international norms: the police were dispatched to violently put down street demonstrations in support of Zelaya (observers have reported at least three deaths), power, water and other supplies were cut off to the embassy, a curfew was imposed in the capital, and the government threatened to violate Brazil's sovereignty by storming the embassy and arresting the ousted president.  

In New York, at the annual meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva Lula requested a special session of the Security Council be convened to address the developing crisis, a request fully endorsed by US president Barack Obama, who hasn't been shy of ordering American officials to intervene on Zelaya's behalf in the embassy.  In response, the candidates standing for the presidency in Honduras' upcoming election have demanded that Micheletti hold talks with Zelaya to bring about resolution, as quickly as possible.

Then this morning, readers of the Washington Post were confronted on the editorial page by none other than Micheletti, who argued passionately for international recognition by the international community of states.  The de facto leader's writing isn't worth the time critiquing here, especially as Adam Isaacson has produced a devastating analysis on his blog with which I almost entirely concur.  But what Isaacson does not point out is that while the op-ed was clearly timed to capture the hearts of minds of leaders assembled at the UN, Zelaya outmaneuvered the Micheletti gang by turning the gathering into a referendum on, and reminder of, how much member states despise the coup and its sponsors.  So much for climate change!

The question now is: what next? 

Zelaya's options are limited, it would seem.  If he leaves the embassy, he risks arrest and trial, or worse.  If he hunkers down at the embassy for the long haul, he risks rendering himself irrelevant as the ineluctable countdown until election time ticks off the few days that remain.

But Micheletti's range of options is equally narrow.  He could order a raid of the embassy and arrest Zelaya, a move that would prove the height of folly.  Not only would it drive the final nail into the coffin of the de facto regime's international legitimacy, it would ignite another, and far scarier, crisis with Brazil at best, and risk military confrontation with the South American superpower at worst.    A shrewder tactic might be to simply quarantine Zelaya in the compound, and attend to other business until election time.  This encounters its own trouble, of course, not least of which would be the continued street protests and possible bloodshed. It also would not reflect well on the government's ability to effectively confront challenges to authority (how would the military react? Could they pay a midnight visit to Micheletti just as they did with Zelaya?), nor does it solve this whole recognition-of-the- next-election problem that has yet to be addressed in any meaningful measure. 

Perhaps neither side will tip the balance.  The time couldn't be riper for a third party to enter the fray and bring resolution to this mess.  Might it be super-mediator Oscar Arias?  One of the presidential candidates, seizing the mantle of leadership during national crisis (which would undoubtedly ensure electoral victory)? Or perhaps the firm hand of Lula? Some combination of these?  To be sure, we won't be seeing the White House issuing invites for Beer Summit II.  Nor does it seem likely that, much as he might wish, Hugo Chavez will play any meaningful role in closing the book on this ugly chapter of Honduran history.  Beyond that, clear ways ahead on the road to restoring order and democracy are obscured by the shadow of social breakdown and violence.  All parties need to tread carefully.