First, my thanks to Alyson Zureick for sending along Francisco Toro and Juan Nagel's op-ed, first published on their Caracas Chronicles blog, then later reposted on The New Republic's website. In sum, the chroniclers from Caracas argue that the deal brokered by the United States -- and which has since seemingly unraveled -- made losers of just about every actor involved save Hillary Clinton's State Department. My preliminary reactions follow below.  Feel free to tell me where I'm wrong!

Toro and Nagel's argument strikes me as more interested in making ideological points than in assessing the situation in good faith, as their anti-Hugo Chavez website is wont to do.  They are certainly correct to note that both Manuel Zelaya and Roberto Micheletti have emerged from this debacle discredited.  I also agree that, should the crisis be resolved (which looks less and less likely as each day passes), the lion's share of credit should be given to Hillary Clinton and her State Department personnel.  Beyond these points, however, Toro and Nagel allow their distaste for Chavez and the Organization of American States get the better of their argument. 

The pair asserts that Hugo Chavez, a "key ally" of Zelaya, lost out because his "main objective...ensuring [that] Zelaya remains in power through indefinite reelection" was stymied, seems to me overblown by half.  While Chavez and Zelaya had indeed aligned before the crisis, Zelaya is hardly the chavista opponents seek to paint him.  Indeed, Zelaya came to power as a center-right candidate in 2005, strongly advocating passage of the Central American Free Trade Agreement, later switching allegiance to Chavez's ALBA initiative in return for Venezuela's political patronage.  The move was clearly a cynical attempt to consolidate political control in the country, as secret tapes of Zelaya and his cronies revealed after being leaked to the media.

It bears pointing out that both the left and right have been wrong on Zelaya from the start.  Far from a staunch defender of ordinary Hondurans, Zelaya has proven time and again to be a shrewd politician concerned above all else with number one.  Chavez realizes this; the political utility of demanding Zelaya's return in his usual, colorful fashion, ran out long ago as Chavez's recent silence on the issue attests.  Yet despite Zelaya's myriad failings as a leader and a politician -- not to mention what would surely have been the president's creepy attempts to erode Honduras' democratic foundations -- the fact remains that he was still undemocratically ejected from office through a military-sponsored coup, which cannot be tolerated or excused under any circumstances.  Here, the entire region -- including both Chavez and US president Barack Obama -- agrees.

On the OAS, Toro and Nagel dismiss the idea that the organization had any positive influence on the negotiation process, "futile" attempts that effectively sidelined it from the process.  Far from it.  Just like any international organization, the OAS is only as strong as its member states allow it to be.  To be sure, the body has been paralyzed in recent years by the polarizing antagonism of Chavez and the previous regime in Washington, and left to drift as its most powerful member -- the United States -- allowed its attention to drift away from the region during the second term of Bill Clinton and just about the entire presidency of George W. Bush. 

But the crisis had the effect of making Chavez and the Obama administration bedfellows in reinstating Zelatya, freeing the OAS -- along with diplomats from State and the diligent Costa Rican president Oscar Arias -- to work out a deal which Toro and Nagel wish to credit entirely to Clinton.  If the deal pans out, pats on the back should most certainly go to Clinton her State Department, but also to Washington's allies in a resolution that resulted from regional cooperative, not Washington unilaterlaism.  And a question needs to be posed: do Toro and Nagel, seeing as they think the organization is ineffectual at best, wish to see the OAS disbanded altogether?  Would US intervention have been as welcomed if it had come unilaterally, or did the OAS stamp of approval and assistance shield Washington from charges that it was exercising imperial control of its "backyard"?  I suspect it was the latter. And what exactly would Toro and Nagel have the OAS do, exactly, if they had their way?  Mobilize for military intervention? 

As a side note, their attack on OAS efforts to reintegrate Cuba into the regional body as the island nation transitions out of fidelismo is nothing more than an attempt to score cheap political points in a game that hasn't been played since the end of the Cold War. They should know better than to resurrect the tired bogeyman of the "Castro Brother Dictatorship" as a threat to regional peace and security. 

Hillary Clinton is to be credited with shrewdly dispatching her diplomats to Tegucigalpa at critical junctures in the negotiation process.  But to suggest that the United States has played its cards flawlessly throughout is misleading.  The most recent example is the State Department's undermining of its own effort, announcing as it did this past week that the United States would recognize the results of the November 29 elections even if the deal fell through.  As the New York Times noted, "On Friday, the State Department sounded as if it had figured that out, warning that "failure to implement the accord could jeopardize recognition of the election by the international community." It needs to leave no doubt."  This seems correct to me. 

If the State Department stands tall against the Micheletti regime's arrogance and brinkmanship tactics, then Toro and Nagel's conclusion that "If this deal leads Honduras away from crisis and toward a legitimate presidential election, if it leads Zelaya and Micheletti to the dustbin of history, then we can count it as Clinton's first substantial achievement in the region," will surely be correct.  But if it doesn't, I fear it will go down as the latest example of Washington's long line of missed opportunities in Latin America .