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Dare we look at the other side? Glance through counter mainstream views on Af-Pak

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Published July 26, 2009

 

In all honesty, I was going to concentrate on issues in development, some cutting edge research going on or something positive, to take the sting out of the day-to-day drudgery. But I was diverted by interesting reads on the new/old theatre of terrorism- the Af-Pak region (brushing aside the catchy Mc-terminology of Af-Pak that has too many things wrong with the lumping of the two countries in a self-fulfilling prophecy).

It was mainly the piece by the brave Afghan woman MP, Malalai Joya that led me to remember isolated but interconnected pieces that uncannily resonate sentiments along similar lines.  According to Joya, under eight years of President Karzai's rule, democracy was a façade, corruption was rampant, and war lords who committed atrocities against the Afghans in the 1990s assumed government positions. This is neither a revelation nor a surprising analysis. What cuts through, is Joya's disillusionment that the 'democracy' backed by NATO and Washington seems poised to remain entrenched even after the new elections, and would be as she puts it, "the same donkey with a new saddle".

Joya also places the new Obama policy regarding Af-Pak as more of the same, with the prophecy that sending more troops and expanding the war into Pakistan will worsen the situation, adding fuel to fire. This opinion, is rare and bold, equating the new policies to be more of the same, and by inversion, destined to doom. Gloomy forecast, gloomier, considering that the theatre has increased focus to include unstable Pakistan- a nuclear state, that despite her problems, is no comparison to the war ravaged Afghanistan.

Which led me to wonder, if, with all due respect, Joya 's opinion mainly hinging on human rights violation issues could be probed deeper as incisive analysis for policy options or be taken as good rhetoric alone?

It reminded me also of Ann Jones' piece which echoed the same sentiments about the deadly mix of corruption, war lords, political opportunism accepted tacitly by the Western governments, all in the name of the war against terror. Jones writes,

"As I write, 4,000 newly arrived U.S. Marines are trudging through the blistering heat of Helmand Province to push back the Taliban so local Pashtuns can turn out to vote next month for Karzai, their fellow Pashtun. What's wrong with this new Obama strategy? For one thing, in some areas the local Pashtun population has instead turned out to fight against the foreign invaders, side by side with the Taliban (who, it should be remembered, are mostly local Pashtuns). They're as fed up as anybody with the puppet Karzai. Like millions of other Afghans, they say Karzai has done nothing for the people. But saddled with history, Karzai remains the horse the U.S. rode in on."

So, here are two venerable voices, blithely questioning western strategies in the region, and throwing the work of eight years of NATO and Washington down the tubes as more of the same. Definitely gives one a moment to ponder, or try to think outside the realm of conventional thinking..

I have to be honest, I dont often come across rational opinion on Af-Pak nowadays, people either seem apologists or harsh critics, be it for Pakistan army, or Afghan government, or Washington and NATO. Not that the threat of Taliban and Al-Qaeda is any lesser ominous, or the lack of government control in Afghanistan, and especially Pakistan's tribal areas is any less a reality.

I checked with Lord Paddy Ashdown. The verdict given by him is no rosier, although he turns the argument around. Instead of picking on an 'easy target' of President Karzai, he admits that the West is failing in Afghanistan, and points out the failure of NATO and Washington to get their acts together. Among a rundown of many reasons as to how opportunity has been squandered time and again by West in Afghanistan, Ashdown mentions that the fatal flaw in design has been the widening of goals- instead of workable target of containing terrorism, the Western desire to create a state that wasn't in a far away country has not only been an over reach, but Afghanistan seems to be faring unsatisfactorily on account of local capabilities.

Noted historian, Professor Bacevich of Boston University, in his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee puts it in no less,

"For political reasons the Obama administration may have banished the phrase Global War on Terror, yet even today the conviction persists that the United States is called upon to dominate or liberate or transform the Greater Middle East. Methods may be shifting, with the emphasis on pacification giving way to militarized nation-building. Priorities may be changing, Af-Pak now supplanting Iraq as the main effort. Yet by whatever name the larger enterprise continues."

Bacevich goes a step further somewhere else,

"Meanwhile, the chief effect of allied military operations there so far has been not to defeat the radical Islamists but to push them across the Pakistani border. As a result, efforts to stabilize Afghanistan are contributing to the destabilization of Pakistan, with potentially devastating implications. September's bombing of the Marriott hotel in Islamabad suggests that the extremists are growing emboldened. Today and for the foreseeable future, no country poses a greater potential threat to U.S. national security than does Pakistan. To risk the stability of that nuclear-armed state in the vain hope of salvaging Afghanistan would be a terrible mistake."

So what side do we take? Does admitting mistakes or taking stock of past follies that might be turning into tomorrow's miseries make one any less committed to the cause of counter terrorism? Whatever the case, one thing for certain is that the costs are too high, in terms of the money being spent, and the precious lives being put at line, be they NATO soldiers or the innocent civilians lost in collateral damage. It never hurts to listen to voices that may seem out of step with the mainstream logic, as they sometimes might wisely lead us from creating grand fiascos that will benefit no one.

 

 

 

 

2 Comments

Hi Nazia, nice peice.  I think it has become pretty widely accepted that the Afghanistan reconstruction project is under duress.  I have always thought that one of the biggest mistakes made by ISAF has been to create unrealistic expectations among the Afghan people.  Has the Karzia government been better than Taliban rule?  Despite his flaws, it would be difficult to make a compelling case to the contrary.  But is it everything the Afghan people were promised, certainly not.  However, while Karzia is not without fault, he is in some ways a victim of circumstance.  In order to cobble together some semblance of stability, Karzia was forced to "cut deals" with, let's say, unreputable people.  This whole process has left a sour taste in the mouths of Afgan's who were expecting a miricle only to find that, outside of Kabul, not much had changed.  So I think you are right to question progress in Afghanistan and by no means should that be construed as being soft on terrorism.  Debate is (almost always) a healthy thing.

PS. Earlier this year I had the good fortune to hear former US Undersecretary of Defense Water Slocombe speak on Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Very interesting stuff.  The video from his talk is here

 


Thank you Mike. Interesting talk by the former Undersecretary, as he mentions things which ought to be done for security sector reform. One point that the Undersecretary raises, and which is logical, is provision of security before the process of state building and reconstruction. Its a tricky situation, as clearing and holding a territory so that reconstruction can take place, is almost always never easy. The Helmand offensive by Nato and US forces would be something to be monitored in the coming days, as the stated purpose there is to clear and hold the area, and later reconstruction would follow.

I agree with you that one of the biggest mistakes has been to creat unrealistic expectations in Afghanistan. I would go further to question how state building can be brought about by external forces.


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Post Date:
July 26, 2009
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nazia hussain

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