Hi Nazia, very interesting post.  Thanks for bringing the conference and its findings to our attention.  I am curious about your shift of terminology from the beginning of the post to the end.  At the start, you discuss failed/failing states, but later switch to a discussion of fragile states.  It seems to me that for the latter, your discussion of the recommendations above is spot-on. 

But what about those failed states?  Do the recommendations still make sense, or is it an entirely different problem.  The report highlights Afghanistan and Haiti as "fragile states," and I wonder if this is only the case (if at all) because of the international security presence of American/NATO troops in Afghanistan and UN peacekeepers in Haiti.  What do you think: is intervention for the purpose of securing--no matter how fleetingly--failing or failed states and hoping that they can reach a "fragile" threshold a good idea, or does it only bring more problems?  If its the latter, then where does the "international community" go from here in cases like Somalia, where I think the argument can be made that labelling it a nation-state would be an overly generous act. 

Hi Michael, thank you for your really useful comment. The shift of terminology is really an oversight, I should kick out the term 'failed state' out of the equation. Thanks for bringing that to attention. Conceptually, I would think that fragile states deteriorate to turn into failing states that later become failed states? Except, it all seems a nice concept, but its application seems to be a bit out of step with real situations. For example, is Afghanistan a failing state or a fragile state? or a failed state? I would think, were it not for the international troops' presence, it would be a failed state, and even now its a failing state. Yet, as you point out, it is considered a 'fragile state' here and elsewhere also.

Secondly, I would have to agree with you there, on the issue of Afghanistan and Haiti being mentioned, due to the presence of international security forces. I suspect the same, and while it seems very convenient and a tad myopic, its not surprising as money/forces/strategic interests dictate policy.

Great point about failed states you made. Should they be left to their own devices, or be helped as well, and if so, following such a paradigm as that followed in fragile states? You mention an interesting example in the case of Somalia. I have read in a few places that Somalia is/could be the next stop of Al-Qaeda fighters as it represents ungoverned spaces of the sort they have a thing for, to put it mildly.

Should failed states be helped?On a matter of principle, they should be aided, as their need is greater. As for the road map to fixing them, do these recommendations work or should their be something more radical, I think this roadmap offered for fragile states is radical in itself, as it has seriously ambitious goals and could be used for failed states as well, as the focus by policy makers seems to invest/transform ungoverned spaces. 

For the ambitious reach of such plans, e.g, read the goal to ' Transform competitive models of decision making into consensus-oriented ones-A continuous dialogue between authorities and local communities is needed to promote legitimacy and accountability, fight corruption and strengthen the social contract. Steps need to be taken to encourage people and communities to see their role in statebuilding and to take responsibility for generating positive change.Notice the words 'transform models of decision making', 'encouraging people to see their role in state building'. These are all good things, but I wonder how external actors could achieve these feats.

Does external intervention create more problems? I would think that some form of external intervention becomes necessary when states start falling apart, but as to the extent and nature of it, perhaps goals could be less grandiose, benchmarks more clear, and accountability of international actors also be a factor. International actors, with their experimentation need to be accountable to someone/something if they fail or make a bigger mess.

Hi Nazia and Michael, there is an interesting, possibly outdated, article written on failed state terminology written by Jean-Germain Gross titled, "Towards a taxonomy of failed states in the New World Order: decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti".  Unfortunately, I can't re-publish it on this site because of copyright issues but it is worth a look.  One of the most basic definitions of state failure is that it occurs when the basic functions of the state are no longer performed (rule of law, basic security ect).

To Michael's point about whether external interventions for the purposes of securing/stabilizing a failing state are effective; it's an interesting question.  The answer, I believe, is circumstantial and depends a lot on the country in question and the nature of the instability.  States with well developed institutions are much easier to pull back from the brink than under-developed states.  Providing security on foreign soil is a difficult task at the best of times, let alone trying to simultaneously construct a judiciary, finance department or basic state infrastructure.  This, among several other prominent factors, is why restabilizing Iraq has proven easier than Afghanistan.

On the other hand the argument has been made that the best thing for the international community to do is to "Give War a Chance" and allow conflict inspired state failure to occur, rather than prolong the process through intervention.  However, this may be less of an option since 9/11.  Thoughts?

Nazia,

Great entry. I am parrticularly taken with the idea of focusing on policing capacity over military capacity. The return-on-investment in policing, one assumes, has got to be somewhat greater than the ROI on military expenditures. (And, given that we're talking about failed/failing/fledgling states, here probably a lot less destablising to regional security dynamics.)

M

Thanks Mike for the useful link about the failed state terminology. Interesting idea of giving war a chance to allow conflict state inspired failure to occur. I fear though, in the situation when really unwholesome forces/groups gain victory over weaker ones, there doesnt seem to be a road map for that one. for instance, when Afghanistan was left on her own, and Taliban gained victory, no country recognized their rule. Seems a very risky option to me, to let the state collapse, but it is certainly an out-of-the-box idea.

Thanks Matt, yes, the policing idea is a catchy one, and certainly needed, to stabilize communities, control crime and build links between state and populace.

Hi everyone,

Great discussion!  To Mike Middleton's point about the variability of cases affecting appropriate responses, I think I may agree.  But the trouble then becomes one of determining by what general principles a la carte decision making for the purposes of intervention in failed states is made.  I worry that without a clear roadmap outlining possible actions for all possible cases, the trend of ignoring inconvenient or undesirable cases will continue, and that interventions--for whatever reasons--

On Iraq for a moment: Mike brings up a good point about the question of institutions.  Yet even in a case of well-developed sociopolitical institutions--like Iraq before the American invasion--foreign military presence seems to be the decisive factor in maintaining even a modicum of stability.  Tom Ricks' blog at Foreign Policy paints a vivid portrait of Iraq's "unravelling" as American forces begin to recede.  I suppose then that I am not fully convinced of this argument.  Perhaps we will have to wait and see what takes place once the US military leaves the country for good.  Or, it could be the case that the Americans effectively pulverized the previous institutions of Saddam Hussein's Iraqi state upon arrival (de-Baathification being one example).  

Thoughts? 

Hi Michael,

Thankyou for the comment. I agree with Mike's idea too, of variability of cases eliciting appropriate responses, but like you mentioned there ought to be general principles, which are there I believe, see for example, OECD's principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States.Maybe the basic premise that state building can be done by external actors, is a grand objective, worthy, but,not entirely feasible? In case of Iraq, one, like you mentioned, it would have to be seen once the US military leaves for good, two, (as you aptly mention) with  the dismissal of the entire Baathist state, pre existing fault lines have come in view, vis-a-vis, socio-political/cultural forces. What is the endgame here though, to create a stable state/ peace loving populace, and how so and by whom? Any thoughts/ideas  would be welcome.