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nazia hussain

State Building as Security oriented Development or Development plus Security- Part I

By nazia hussain - 11 months ago

As promised in the last post, more on state building/nation building/peacebuilding efforts that revolve around fixing fragile states. This is the first of the series of three blogs that take a look at how practitioners perceive these ideas and counterviews of these efforts, again from the practitioners’ point of view.

So, in our previous blog conversation we figured that it is an established policy truth now that fragile states need to be fixed so there are limited spillovers in the form of crazy trigger happy non state actors, epidemics, refugees and other such destabilizing factors. Through this really shallow study of reports written by actors as World Bank, DFID, USAID, OECD and others, the promising fact that emerged was the openness of thought process/nuanced thinking and at least avowed willingness to learn from mistakes.

The starting point of our bird eye view is the 10 principles for good international engagement in fragile states, which are as follows:

  1. Take context as the starting point
  2. Ensure all activities do no harm
  3. Focus on state building as the central objective
  4. Prioritize prevention
  5. Recognize the links between political, security and development objectives
  6. Promote non discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies
  7. Align with local priorities in different ways and in different contexts
  8. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors
  9. Act fast but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance
  10. Avoid pockets of exclusion (aid orphans)

So, practitioners in the field(donor governments and their agencies for development and International Organizations as World Bank) agree on state building as their ultimate goal. The way to get there for each player is different, but the guiding principle remains the same, ie, state building in fragile states is imperative.

Secondly, the other basic premise is centrality of state as the key player. No matter how weak a government, or how fragile a state, the focus is on strengthening state capacity and role.

It makes complete sense in theory. You need a state to carry out basic functions, provide security to citizens, opportunities for a decent life, and be held accountable for their actions.  This is all good on paper, but it is harder to act upon in reality, and often it seems that the actions of donor governments/agencies are undermining the very goal they are working for.

Furthermore, every actor has their own roadmap of how to bring about this state building/helping fragile states business. So for example, if the goal is to help a country bring about effective governance, the roads leading towards it may diverge. Some actors might encourage reformist non state actors so that they can force or take over the government for effective governance. Some actors may try to work within the system and try to institute changes in a milder manner.

Take the example of USAID's policy options for vulnerable states (those states unable or unwilling to adequately assure the provision of security and basic services to significant portions of their populations and where the legitimacy of the government is in question. This includes states that are failing or recovering from crisis).

 The political approach regarding fragile states entails the following:

  • Where possible, support reforms within government institutions, particularly those responsible for the rule of law, core social services, and food security.
  • Support reformers outside government, particularly those advocating improvements in security, human rights, core services, food security, natural resource management, and anticorruption.
  • Strengthen oversight institutions, such as legislative and parliamentary committees.
  • Encourage formal means of political competition, for example, by supporting free and fair elections and other political processes.
  • Encourage private sector/NGO/political party reform alliances that include the perspectives of tradi­tional identity groups.
  • Develop the professionalism of the media, particularly in investigative journalism, and expand access to information.

Bear in view that USAID uses the term fragile states to refer to a broad range of failing, failed and recovering states. According to the agency's own admission, distinction among them is not clear in practice always, and thus their strategy distinguishes between fragile states that are vulnerable from those already in crisis.

Now consider how sweeping and interventionist the road map is. And this is 'vulnerable states' we are talking about. The crisis hit states are a new level of ballgame. The same level of engagement goes in other sectors that have been termed as economic or military aspects of state building, but that are highly politicized issues. For example, the economic goal to help improve taxation and revenue generation seems like a harmless technocratic strategy, but involves renegotiating the elite status quo, or taxing the already over taxed middle class- implying the explosive nature of the very goal that seeks to strengthen the state. Likewise, the security goal to develop and strengthen civilian control of military is no easy feat, and entails sometimes unsettling really old patterns of power sharing, which while desirable, are long drawn and messy processes.

DFID, the UK agency for development, represents a more nuanced and interesting approach. I highly recommend reading this paper that captures the essence of their idea of state building and peace building. According to DFID's operational approach, they will,

  • Prioritize and sequence
  • Design interventions to support the four objectives (support inclusive political settlement, address causes of conflict and build resolution mechanisms, develop state survival functions-security, revenue, rule of law, respond to public expectations)
  • Stay engaged for the long term
  • Think and work politically
  • Take a regional approach
  • Adapt aid instruments
  • Measure progress and learn lessons

The methods in theory at least seem more nuanced in DFID's approach, but the breadth of their goals and strategies are as encompassing as set down by USAID and others. While DFID realizes that state building and peace building are messy and endogenous processes, they maintain that building peaceful states and societies needs to be central to donor responses in conflict affected and fragile states.

So basically, this is the nature of the monster we are dealing with. Call it humanitarian/neo imperialism, or as the policy makers call it-peace building and state building in fragile states, state building agenda is not going anywhere anytime soon. More on this from the perspective of World Bank and others in the coming post.

 

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3 Comments

 
Michael Middleton Michael Middleton - 11 months ago

Hi Nazia, nice post and good resources.  Certainly you are right to point out the potential pitfalls in these strategies, but what are the alternatives? Should the West simply but out and leave vulnerable states to fail? Is there not a moral responsibility to help? Conversely, (and to play devil's advocate) as failed states pose a demonstrated risk to international security, is intervention not justified to prevent this from happening?

Also, you are quite right to point out that the USAID program is state centric, and while I think I know your answer, do you agree with this position. For myself, I happen to agree with a state-centered development approach. While I acknowledge that strong people make strong states, I don't think you can do a complete end-run around the state and deal with civil society directly. If nothing else, the state is an essential organizational/logistical tool for development. Simple things like road maintenance, postal service, identification, educational infrastructure, water sanitation ect. are all functions of the state and needed in order for effective development to occur. Yes micro-credit loans and community initiatives are excellent complimentary programs, but they are enabled by state infrastructure. How would you extend a loan to someone who cannot prove their identity, has no place to keep their money or register a business? Thoughts?

 

 


 
nazia hussain nazia hussain - 11 months ago

Thanks Mike. You raise an excellent point, and perhaps the basic premise of it all, i.e, what is the alternative? I think definitely not that extensive a state building agenda by external actors.The justification for such grand interventions is rooted though in 9/11's aftermath, i would think. And thus related to defense agendas predominantly. Which makes sense from the donors' point of view. Only it doesnt cut the same argument for those in these failed states. If we are talking about the people here as vectors of instability, they are coming in the crossfire of both the Nato/american forces and the militants, be it Iraq or Afg. Maybe then, for everyone's sake, the donors could stick to defeating militant groups, and selective aid allocation, instead of reforming the entire place up. Because it doesnt seem to be working, and seems like a big waste of resources and lives. Also, the debate about state building/peace building needs to be expanded, and the solutions renegotiated, as the present thinking seems to be rigid in its thought and practice.

Also, while I agree the state is the main player, evidence seems to suggest that the aid measures are emasculating the state, and thus being  counter productive. Plus, do you sense a flaw in the argument, when they say the people are vectors of instability and yet, at times, it confuses me, how some aid programs attempt to empower communities, while some target government reform. Whose side are they on?Also, the benchmarks for success seem abstract, and then there is the question of donor accountability. What do you think?


 
Michael Middleton Michael Middleton - 11 months ago

Hi Nazia, you have certainly raised a lot of very interesting points. I think that it is somewhat problematic to lump Iraq and Afghanistan into the same category. While they both are currently occupied by NATO forces, Iraq had many existing state institutions that could be adapted and reformed into functional government bodies. Conversely, after years of conflict, the government infrastructure in Afghanistan varied from non-existent to dysfunctional. Therefore, much more state-building is needed in Afghanistan than in Iraq.

To the larger question about why state building is needed, I think, having gone into their countries and caused widespread damage and disruption, western states have a moral obligation to leave these countries in better shape than when they arrived. I realize that one, this is a tall order and two, that the definition of "better" is a relative term. But I think that there are some obvious areas where Afghanistan could use some help such as the provision of a basic level of security, construction of a reasonably effective judicial system and provision the basic state infrastructure such as electricity, sanitation, water ect. However, to your point about "emasculating the state", I think you are quite right. All of these actions need to be done in conjunction with the people and government of Afghanistan.


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