Today's edition of my monthly column with the Guelph Mercury
Link to online version here.
On Aug. 27, Polish media began reporting that the Obama administration would not pursue an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) shield for eastern Europe. Since that time, other media have confirmed Washington's growing reluctance to see the initiative through.
An undertaking of Obama's predecessor, president George W. Bush, the ABM program for eastern Europe would have featured a radar system in the Czech Republic and 10 missile interceptor sites in Poland. The Bush administration sought to justify the implementation of this eastern European ABM shield - which required America's withdrawal from the ABM treaty - as necessary to defend Europe from Iranian missile attack.
Obama reportedly agreed to spike the initiative in exchange for the Russian Federation's co-operation in securing Iran's verifiable suspension of all military nuclear activities. This, the reasoning goes, would have undercut the need for the program in the first place, enabling the United States to achieve its security objectives without pursuing a policy antagonistic to Russia. This was all part of "resetting" - Obama's diplomatic shibboleth - U.S.-Russian relations.
This was a mistake on the administration's behalf, however, which leaves the U.S. weaker, eastern Europeans more vulnerable, and Iran dangerously emboldened.
First of all, Obama traded away a bargaining chip to Russia in exchange for future payment - specifically, Russia's help in making sure Iran does not achieve a military nuclear capability. This is naiveté worthy of the Carter administration, and reveals what more hawkish security analysts suspected all along: Obama was simply searching for an excuse to abandon a project ideologically antithetical to his own views.
As a result, Iran is now no less dangerous and Russia is now no less obstructionist. In fact, the Russian Federation vigorously broadcasts its opposition to further sanctions on Iran, let alone military strikes. As a permanent, veto-wielding member of the United Nations Security Council, this all but ensures the UN no longer represents a viable platform for decisively managing Iran's ongoing nuclear activities.
Second, Obama's abandonment of an ABM shield for eastern Europe is precisely the wrong move at precisely the wrong time. Why? Under Obama, ABM defence for Europe makes sense. Under Bush, it didn't.
ABM defence was always a suspicious, illogical initiative under Bush's watch because the Bush administration would never have accepted Iranian nuclear armament in the first place. Rejecting defensive containment strategies as flaccid and dangerous, Bush instead pursued a policy of nuclear counter-proliferation in the Middle East: a forward-leaning policy of ensuring nuclear threats from rogue states never materialize.
Under Obama, however, ABM defence is logical. This defensive policy of nuclear containment fits with the current president's less-hawkish, more-multilateral approach to international relations. Since Obama's Washington remains unwilling to commit the U.S. to attacking Iranian nuclear or missile facilities should diplomacy fail, the abortive ABM shield would have given U.S. allies in the region an insurance policy against the Obama administration's possible resignation to Iran's nuclear trajectory.
Having adopted a less assertive global security strategy than his predecessor, the ABM shield was an opportunity for Obama to show strength to the international community and build confidence in his restrained and cautious foreign policy. He could have shown resolve in the face of Russian intransigence, Iranian belligerence, western European insouciance, and American war fatigue.
Not only has he lost that opportunity, but in forgoing ABM defence for eastern Europe, Obama has predicated American foreign and defence policy less on American capability, and more on Russian good will.
Not a good bet. Just ask the Poles and the Czechs.
13 Comments
Regular readers will notice that I've hashed this issue over a few times here at the blog. Indeed. I've found the exchanges I'd had with other bloggers and administrators to be extremely valuable in stimulating new views and challenging old perspectives.
For what it's worth, let me just say that the above article is written - as short opinion-type articles always are - with a certain angle in mind. The angle I focus on in this piece is the Russian dynamic. I am equally interested in the flip-side of the Russian dynamic, which is the deep entrenchment in Europe of American defence capacities and leadership. This whole initiative, I feel, was always about much more than Iran and much more than Russia. It is (was) about deeply and permanently entrenching eastern European partnership with the United States, as a constitutive element of the former administration's vision for sustained US global military dominance and US relevance to political and security-related decision making in Europe.
Hey Matt, Congratualtions on this!
I have a question, as you might expect. I take your argument concerning Eastern European defense and the points about Russia which all make sense as far as they go, but am unclear still about the role of Iran. How does this weaken US strategy vis-avis Tehran? My understanding is that part of the plan involves ramping up protection for Israel against potential short-range missile attacks from Iran. Also, are you sure that Moscow will continue its stiff resistance to sanctions against Tehran. Reports today have Russian officials refusing to comment on it, which is a slightly different position than before. Thoughts on how this all may develop?
Michael,
Thanks for the thoughtful comment. I was most interested to see the possible subtle changes to Russia's dipolmatic posture regarding Iran. Will be following this with interest.
Your questions regarding the Europe-Russia-Iran connexion are very good and very valid. As I mentioned in the above comment, this piece was indeed written with one certain angle in mind, and you're right to raise the implied relationship with the others.
The general support I have indicated for the now former BMD plan stems from multiple sources. Just as there is perhaps no one *decisive* argument in favour of the Iraq War, my view was and is that it was the best policy and that it yielded a number of opportunities for positive change which together, on balance, made the case for war (or, in this case, BMD) compelling.
To wit, some of the main reasons the Iraq War was, to my mind, justified, are as follows:
- defence of international law (I know we disagree on this point, Michael, and I respect your view)
- putting the US and the west on the side of liberty and change in the middle east as opposed to the dangerous and oppressive status quo (US support for the status quo played a huge role in driving anti-US and anti-western sentiment in the US and aided terror organisations in their recruitment efforts)
- choosing a policy of counter-proliferation in the middle east which was essential to shore up the credibility of the non-proliferation norm in light of the UNSC's unwilingness to verifiably disarm one of the worst WMD users and concealers in history
- creating the impression and the reality that terror would have to contend with law and liberty in its pursuit of being the defining international political characteristic of the early 21st century
- ending the sanctions regime which made the west complicit in creating the miserable living conditions in Iraq
- etc., etc.
All these factors were taking into consideration prior to the Iraq War, and only together and only when subordinated to a ...
grand strategic vision does the case become compelling.
Likewise, the case for the BMD system is compelling on balance due to several reasons, including:
- clearly indicating that Russian expansionism will not be permitted and that former soviet satellites are now free to choose their own political trajectories
- reassuring allies in the greater middle east that the US was serious about protecting them from nuclear aggression. The robust nature of this plan would have done this in a more dramatic and more compelling (and, by many counts, less expensive and more reliable) way than the alternative option being presently entertained by the Obama administration
- deeply entangling US defence capabilities and strategy with those of eastern European allies. This is key to cementing US political power and security leadership in Europe in the future, and it places emphasis on US relationships with those countries that continue to struggle for the ability and security to align themselves with the free nations of the west
- the now stymied BMD plan was an important political act on behalf of the US, Poland and the Czech Republic. The US persuaded these states that America was serious about the plan and that any feelings of anxiety they may have about Russia's reaction would not compare to the strong US support they would have under the plan. The Poles and the Czechs stuck their necks out for the US, and now they're left with nothing to show for it except for a very large, very angry neighbour, which very recently put on quite the display of regional dominance by marching troups about five proverbial minutes outside of Georgia's capital. This is bad for future US negotiations.
Now, again, it is possible that none of these or the other points in favour of the shield are decisive, but together, I think they provide a balance of argument in favour of the Bush plan.
As you can see, I think a great proportion of the arguments in the above sets of justifications are political in nature ..
and indicates a major attachment to diplomatic signalling, ideology, perception, communication, etc. The technical arguments, interestingly, are not, in my view, decisive on the BMD plan. (There is a hugely compelling case that even if the threat of a nuclear missile launch by Iran had only a 1/300 chance of success, the prudent strategist would assume the worst and act accordingly. This isn't the only logic relevant to a calculation as to whether the system, from a technical perspective, was valuable, but it is a very important one). The politics and diplomacy of the old plan were its core strengths, in my view.
To be frank, I am extremely uncomfortable when I finish reading this article. I am not here to have a fight with you, but express the opinion of a civilian from a country which label itself as partner rather than ally.
With all due respect, it may be viewed as a typical product of "the American Imperialism", a Chinese version of the American unilaterism. If a potential disagreement is enough to "ensure UN no longer represents a viable platform for decisively managing Iran's ongoing nuclear activities", then give me a reason why China, or any country, shall in any case hold obligation to UN or WTO. It may not occur to some people (and a large proportion of the world population) that the motivation of the States is beyond the national interest, which manifests itself in the recent tyre disputes among U.S. and the rest of the world, rather than withChina alone.
If we enters the realm of realism and discard all the ideologies away, I think the world Obama faces is largely different from the world Bush faces.Yes, American is still the single super-power in the world; and yes, if he decides to destroy anyone, it is just a matter of cost and time. However, what we shall be aware of is that the age that everybody has to listen his doctrine, both politically and economically, has passed and those good old days may never return. Suppose Iran decides to develope nuclear weapons anyway, is the war against Tehran affordable? Will Beijing, as the largest lender to U.S., feel comfortable to finance another military campaign which potentially endanger to her own supply of oil? Imagine the mutual destructive effect of a global financial 'nuclear' war, a more eminent threat compared to the 1/300 chance of an out-dated Iranian missile.
And by the way, AMD gives rise to deficit which the majority of the U.S. citizens hate under current situation, especially if they are reminded that those money are not spent on protecting themselves but certain allies in the middle east.
Hi there Junchen,
Thanks so much for stopping by and participating in the debate.
Of course, you touch on a number of important themes. Is the ABM shield a form of imperialism? Is it emblematic of legitimate security relationships between allies? Etc...
You also discussed the cost of the programme. There's good evidence out there that the Czech/Poland ABM shield would have been a good bit more cost-effective than the sea-based alternatives, as well as more technologically sound.
At any rate, thanks again for stopping by.
Best
M
Matthew, one of your arguments on BMD just doesn't ring true to me. (Many on Iraq don't ring true either, but that's a separate issue.)
You say that BMD "clearly indicating that Russian expansionism will not be permitted and that former soviet satellites are now free to choose their own political trajectories."
Yet neither Bush nor Obama ever defended BMD as a counter to Russia, at least as far as I'd read. BMD was generally put forward as a defence against possible nuclear strikes by rogue states like Iran or North Korea. 21st century BMD was quite explicitly not intended to counter Russian capabilities.
(A wise decision. There is no conceivable BMD system that could do it, and the consequences of announcing a system that gives America nuclear carte blanche against Russia could be rather dire, if not Strangelovian.)
So I'm not quite sure why you think this would serve as any sort of check to Russian expansionism . The ABM system could not stop a Russian nuclear strike, and was supposedly never intended to stop a Russian nuclear strike. Besides, All Russia needs to do to dictate terms to much of Eastern Europe is turn off the oil pipelines; the rest would almost certainly be daunted by Russia's conventional capabilities.
Eastern European BMD may deter Iran, though I'm a bit unclear on why Iran would invite international wrath and a guaranteed military response on an attack on, say, Poland in the first place. But I really, really don't see how it could deter Russia.
Hi Craig,
Nice to make your acquaintence, and thanks for stopping by.
As to your points.
I believe you are correct in that neither Mr. Bush nor Mr. Obama ever framed BMD as being primarily about checking Russia. But that doesn't mean it wasn't part of the policy, and it certainly doesn't mean that was unnatural for Russia to view it as somewhat threatening.
Given the history of BMD, being for most of its life a system dedicated to eroding the efficacy of the Soviet nuclear deterrent, it would be highly unlikely that a Bush or Obama BMD plan could shake free these US v. Russia connotations. When I argue that BMD would have been a check against Russian expansionism, I am speaking only peripherally about the actual nuts and bolts of the BMD system in and of itself. Rather, it represented an important entanglement of US and eastern European defence strategies and capabilities, signalled the deepening and broadening of these political-security alliances and may have (I would argue "would have", you may differ on this point) signalled to the Russian "near abroad" that partnership with the United States and the western world it leads is a viable and safe option if you commit to it. Now these small allies are left at the altar.
Your point about "strangelovean" policies is funny, though I'm not sure I can readily identify the value-added. (That's not cheeky - I think I'm just missing something.) The Russian Federation would never, as I think you meant to imply, tolerate a policy that rendered its nuclear retaliatory capacity flacid. Scholars have very widely held that Russia believes its dormant but breathing capacity to meaningfully retaliate against (or, really, "annihalate") the US is central to global security and its own defence.
Your recognition of Russia's role in energy power politics is valid, and adds to the reasons why the west need to strengthen alliances in this region and generate energy transit routes that do not flow through Russian controlled territory.
Well, I can easily explain the "value-added". It was revealed a little while back that the Russians had a "doomsday device" known by a variety of names, but principally as Perimetr or " Dead Hand". It was a system designed to launch even if nobody was there to push the button. Quote follows:
Perimeter... was designed to lie semi-dormant until switched on by a high official in a crisis. Then it would begin monitoring a network of seismic, radiation, and air pressure sensors for signs of nuclear explosions. Before launching any retaliatory strike, the system had to check off four if/then propositions: If it was turned on, then it would try to determine that a nuclear weapon had hit Soviet soil. If it seemed that one had, the system would check to see if any communication links to the war room of the Soviet General Staff remained. If they did, and if some amount of time—likely ranging from 15 minutes to an hour—passed without further indications of attack, the machine would assume officials were still living who could order the counterattack and shut down. But if the line to the General Staff went dead, then Perimeter would infer that apocalypse had arrived. It would immediately transfer launch authority to whoever was manning the system at that moment deep inside a protected bunker—bypassing layers and layers of normal command authority. At that point, the ability to destroy the world would fall to whoever was on duty: maybe a high minister sent in during the crisis, maybe a 25-year-old junior officer fresh out of military academy. And if that person decided to press the button ... If/then. If/then. If/then. If/then.
(Con'd)
(Quote continues) Once initiated, the counterattack would be controlled by so-called command missiles. Hidden in hardened silos designed to withstand the massive blast and electromagnetic pulses of a nuclear explosion, these missiles would launch first and then radio down coded orders to whatever Soviet weapons had survived the first strike. At that point, the machines will have taken over the war. Soaring over the smoldering, radioactive ruins of the motherland, and with all ground communications destroyed, the command missiles would lead the destruction of the US.
Here's what is truly horrifying: it was totally secret . The Americans had no idea that it existed. That's why it's "Strangelovian": it is a doomsday device that couldn't deter America.
That, in turn, leads to the striking thing about the system. It was intended to deter the Soviets, not the Americans. By guaranteeing a Soviet second-strike no matter how terrible an American preemptive strike could be, they deterred that section of the Politburo and military that might have launched early to deny Americans a "victory" in a nuclear exchange. The Soviets knew that, thanks to Dead Hand, no American nuclear victory was ever possible, and negotiated from that standpoint. It may be that Dead Hand was what stopped nuclear Armageddon.
That's how important second-strike capability is, Matthew. As I'm sure you know, it is MAD. BMD and ABM systems were so carefully described as not being intended to deter Russia to reassure Russian that would not lose its second-strike capability—leaving Dead Hand out of it for the moment—else it could easily lead to a very tense international situation.
And that's also why I'm still not convinced that ABM treaties would deter Russia. "Entanglement" could only mean, at the end of the day, that Poland et al would be guaranteed American military support in a crisis. Yet, ABM system or no, that seems extraordinarily unlikely. Is it really likely that America would risk escalation?
Hi Craig,
Thanks again for the continued comments. I appreciate the time you've taken to engage the material here.
The Dead Hand system is fascinating, and I think you make a very important point:
That, in turn, leads to the striking thing about the system. It was intended to deter the Soviets, not the Americans. By guaranteeing a Soviet second-strike no matter how terrible an American preemptive strike could be, they deterred that section of the Politburo and military that might have launched early to deny Americans a "victory" in a nuclear exchange. The Soviets knew that, thanks to Dead Hand, no American nuclear victory was ever possible, and negotiated from that standpoint. It may be that Dead Hand was what stopped nuclear Armageddon.
First of all, I was not at all acquainted with the Dead Hand initiative prior to your telling me about it. So thanks for the information.
I agree with you that MAD - and the certainty within Soviet ranks that the USSR could not conceivably "lose" in a strategic nuclear exchange with the United States - was an important element of keeping the cold war cold. (Of course, we can't be absolutely certain what prevented a nuclear exchange, but fear of escalation and the logic of deterrence are plausible explanations.)
In light of my having said that the "nuts and bolts" of the BMD system - which could not meaningfully undermine a Russian strategic nuclear strike - I think you'll notice that I agree with you that the BMD system was not about undermining Russia's nuclear capaibilities. When I emphasise the role BMD could have played in "entangling" the foreign and defence policies of former Soviet satellites with those of the United States, I am speaking about lower-order military and political trajectories which could have helped further entrench host states within the North Atlantic community.
BMD would have perhaps been quite useful against a missile or two from a rogue state. That is it's technical advantage. BMD would perhaps have been...
very useful also in advancing the process of aligning eastern European states within the community of the North Atlantic, and so advance the goals of self-determination, (relatively) free markets, reliable (well... you could poke holes in this one) security guarantees from western powers and the right to pursue political, foreign, trade, and defence policies without fear of substantive retribution from Russia.
My articles and blog posts on BMD are admittedly a little bit convoluted. My language has not always been clear, and some other readers have kindly pointed out that this represents the - in their view, wanting - logic of the Bush administration which pursued policies via myriad moral/strategic/legal/normative justifications.
My view - and I hope to continue improving the quality of my communicating this - is that BMD was an incisive policy which was meant to integrate eastern Europeans ever more deeply within the North Atlantic community, while signalling to Russia that her imperial designs for this region (political interference, energy and military intimidation, whatever) are not on.
BMD would have also advanced US interests in countering and preventing nuclear proliferation in the middle east, by strengthening defence arrangements with Arab states and pre-empting the perceived need in these states to develop indigenous nuclear capacities.
And finally, please accept my sincere apology if the "value added" statement in an earlier response appeared in any way malign. I assure you it was not meant that way, and if I communicated that poorly I am awfully sorry.
Please do continue to hold me to account! I'm delighted to have engaged such thoughtful comments on this post.